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Abstract
This paper discusses economic impacts of cuts m the defense budget in terms of output and 
employment for the US economy After introductory comments on Gross National Product 
(GNP) welfare and economic welfare two regression results of1 linear equations are presented 
that are designed to measure the influence of defense spending on economic growth However 
a better analysis of future trends is provided by simulation of a more sophisticated econometric 
model. In the last part, possible impacts on the employment situation are considered and the 
concept of conversion is discussed A decrease m GNP and employment in the short run but 
a faster long term growth after an adjustment period is very likely
Economic Impact of Cuts in Defense Spending1
Frank Schorf heide
Introduction
At the end of the 1980s when the Cold War order collapsed, lagging innovation low productivity growth a 
huge budget deficit and competitiveness problems indicated to many observers that the economy of the United 
States was in decime For some such as Yale historian Paul Kennedy these problems were linked to high 
levels of defense spending during the last forty years 2 George F Kennan wrote m a recent New York Times 
article It [the Cold War] greatly overstrained the economic resources of both countries (the United States and 
the Soviet Union) leaving both by the end of the 1980s confronted with heavy financial social and m the 
case o f the Russians political problems that neither had anticipated and for which neither was fully prepared 3 
But the relationship between economic strength and defense expenditures is not undisputed Gold and Adams 
concluded it is far from clear that defense spending can explain either the peaks or the valleys of US economic 
performance or the change in its economic position relative to other countries **♦
With substantially improved relations between the United States and the now mdependent republics of the 
former Soviet Union new opportunities are offered to reduce the resources consumed by military arsenals of 
weapons However the Persian Gulf war m 1991 ensured skeptical folks to advocate the maintenance of a high 
capability to conduct demanding military operations m the new post Cold War era. In this paper I deal with the 
economic consequences of downsizing the military rather than looking for and analyzing new external threats 
The US economy is now recovering from a recent recession with low output and high unemployment Cutting 
back the defense sector will at least m the short run lead to lay-offs both in the defense related industries and m 
military troops Therefore this idea is not very popular m regions that rely heavily on the defense or armed 
forces industries Tutting America back to work” was a crucial issue m the 1992 election campaign and 
statements on disarmament were accompanied by statements referring to the unemployment problem So the 
crucial question is what happens to the economy if military spending is drastically reduced is it the end or the 
beginning of a new recession? I intend to look at possible effects on output and employment and to address the 
question of whether economic considerations prohibit or slow down the process of disarmament?
GNP and Welfare
Before starting the analysis on economic consequences of a lower defense budget, I will present some remarks on 
GNP welfare and economic welfare The GNP refers to production during a particular time period, usually a 
year or a quarter of a year There are three different ways of thinking about GNP First, it can be a measure of 
spending on goods and services by different groups household, business government, and foreigners Second 
it can be a measure of production in different industries, and third, a measure of total wage and profit mcome 
earned by different groups producing GNP5 In terms of spending on goods and services produced during any 
period, the GNP can be broken down as follows
(1) Y = C + I  + NDG + DG + X
where
Y is Gross National Product (GNP)
C is Consumption
1 An earlier version of this paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for Political Science 281 
International Security and Arms Control m November 1992.
2. Paul Kennedy The Rise and the F all c fth e  Great Powers (New York Vintage Bodes 1987)
3 George F Kennan, “The G O.P Won the Cold W ar? Ridiculous ” The New York Times 28 October 1992 A1S
4 David Gold and Gordon Adams “Defence Spending and the American Economy ” Defence Economics 1 (1990) 275
5 Robert E. Hall and John B Taylor M acroeconomics (New York Norton and Company 1991) 28 29
2I  is Investment
NDG is government spending m the civilian sector 
DG is government spending m the defense sector 
X  are net exports (exports imports)
Unlike GNP welfare is a very wide ranging term and difficult to define Pigou laid down more or less 
dogmatically two propositions first, that the elements of welfare are states of consciousness and, perhaps their 
relations, secondly that welfare can be brought under the category of greater and less ^  Instead of investigating 
all groups of causes by which welfare thus conceived, may be affected—a quite impractical task—he defined the 
term economic welfare as part of social welfare that can be brought directly or indirectly into a relationship with 
the measuring rod of money The problem of inferring that economic welfare is welfare as a whole is there is 
no guarantee that the effects produced on the part of welfare that can be brought into relation with the measuring 
rod of money may not be canceled by effects of a contrary kind brought about m other parts or aspects of 
welfare ^  In the context o f this paper external security against hostile attacks becomes a crucial dimension of 
welfare
To illustrate the relationship between GNP and economic welfare consider two economies with balanced 
trade (X=0) Using equation one the spending on goods and services is given for both economies in Table 1 
In the first year economy A and economy B produce the same GNP Using the GNP as an indicator for 
economic welfare both economies are m the same situation. However due to lower defense expenditures the 
government of the second economy can afford to spend more money on non-defense purposes e g  to provide 
education health care and social security Therefore it can be argued that in the broader sense of economic 
welfare economy A is m a better situation than economy B
TA B LE 1 G N P and E conom ic W elfare (m  b illio n s o f U S do llars)
Year I Year 2 Growth Rates t%1
E con A E co n B E con A E con  B E con A E co n B
c 70 00 70 00 71 40 71 05 2 0 1 5
I 20 00 20 00 20 40 20 40 2 0 2 0
NEC 8 00 5 00 8 16 5 15 2 0 3 0
DG 2.00 5.00 2.04 5.50 2 A 10.0
Y 100 00 100 00 102 00 102 10 2 0 2 1
For the second year assume the growth rates given m the last two columns of Table 1 The GNP growth 
rate of the second economy is bigger than the growth rate of the first economy mainly due to the fast growing 
defense sector After one year while the consumption m A has increased to $7140 billion the consumption m 
B is only $7105 billion The non-defense government expenditures m A are $8 16 billion compared to $5 15 
billion m B Therefore again, the first economy may be better off than the second economy even though the 
usual economic indicators GNP and growth of GNP support the alternate statement. Furthermore these 
figures tell nothing about the engine of growth Is the growth of the second economy induced by large 
government investments in the defense sector financed by an external debt asm  the early years of the Reagan 
administration? Employment, wages income distribution inflation and further indicators are neglected m this 
example and the relationship between macroeconomic indicators and economic welfare is not well defined.
Table 1 shows that knowledge of Y  and growth of y  is not sufficient to judge which economy has a higher 
economic welfare If we include the security aspect in our notion of welfare we need information about the 
relationship o f these economies to their environment. If both economies are threatened by powerful aggressors 
then the possible greater economic welfare of an economy with lower military spending may be of limited 
duration due to that country s inability to defend its territory
According to the historical changes mentioned m the introduction to this paper I assume for the post Cold 
War era a significant, smaller external security threat for the United States so that possible positive effects on 
the economic welfare m this country are not canceled by effects of a contrary kind brought about through the 
security aspect of welfare
6l Arthur C Pigou, The Economies o f W elfare 4th ed.(Edmborgh R. and R. Clark, 1932) 10 
7 Ibid. 12.
3Defense Spending and Output
To get an idea o f the relationship between a lower military budget and the output of the US economy I 
investigated the impact of defense expenditures and defense growth. Kenneth Oye asserted, military spending 
depresses economic growth by limiting resources that can be devoted to investment or consumption ”8 The 
lower expansion of GNP is often called opportunity costs of defense Consider the spending equation (1) and an 
upper bound for Y in the short run due to capacity constraints. Oye stated that *under closed economy 
assumptions military spending must come at the expense of either consumption or investment.”9 In Table 1 I 
do not assume a closed economy and I distinguish between private and public investments Therefore four basic 
steps to compensate an increase m military spending are conceivable reducing domestic consumption, reducing 
private investment, reducing exports or increasing imports and reducing non-defense government spending
Changes m the long run economic growth are determined by the production factors labor and capital and 
the technology (production function) Investment results m mercase of the capital stock. If the capital stock 
increases and the supply of labor is large enough to utilize the plants and machinery the economic system can 
grow If the short run result of higher defense expenditures is a crowding out of consumption the capital stock 
is not affected and therefore economic growth does not change The people are saving more mcome to afford a 
greater military force In this case I could argue that less consumption means a lower standard of living and a 
decrease of the nation s wealth This effect is known as the guns and butter tradeoff ”
A crowding out of private investment would possibly result m lower long term growth as Oye and others 
state This is called the “guns and growth trade off ” Increasing imports or decreasing exports to compensate for 
higher military costs results in changes of the net lending or borrowing position of the economy in the rest of 
the world. Adaptations o f non-defense government spending could influence growth due to less investment in 
infrastructure or human resources íe  curb education or affect welfare more directly m terms of a reduced social 
security n et
Up to this point, I have assumed that Y cannot mercase m the short run This assumption is only valid if 
the production factors are fully utilized. However if additional production capacity is available a higher total 
output generated by increased defense spending is possible In dus context, Oyes s argument10 is inaccurate 
Weidenbaum mentioned that several studies tend to show *that defense has not drained investment funds from the 
civilian economy Specifically the investment share of GNP has not varied inversely to the defense share 
rather it is primarily consumption that moves inversely with defense spending ”u  Cross-country comparisons 
of growth patterns similiar to the studies of Oye12 are methodically very problematic because causalities are 
difficult to determine
There are several factors that influence growth besides the defense burden The economies of Japan and 
Germany were almost destroyed after World War U and had to be rebuilt completely they have different socio 
cultural environments different education systems different saving rates and so forth A related aspect is the 
issue of whether military spending on research and development (R&D) crowds out civilian R&D Le money 
for civilian projects is limited or the employment of scientists and engineers m the civilian sector is constrained 
due to excess demand on the labor market Weidenbaum examined the movement of civilian R&D when 
military R&D rises and the movement of civilian R&D when military R&D falls for the period 1949 1988 13 
R&D is measured by its share of GNP The data show that civilian R&D moved m the same direction for 
seventeen years and in the opposite direction for sixteen years. Using this approach no significant statistical 
relationship between civilian and military R&D shares of GNP is evident. Weidenbaum mentioned three 
reasons for arriving at a conclusion so different from that of the conventional wisdom that says that military 
R&D comes at the expense of civilian R&D ‘First of all the trends m both military and civilian R&D may be 
influenced by a common set of factors such as changes m a society s general desire to promote science and
8. Kenneth A. Oye and Robert J  Lieber Donald Rothchfld eds.. Eagle ut a New World (New York Harper Colima Publishers Inc 
1992) 8 
9 Ibid.
10 Und. 8 10
11 Murray W eidenbaum, Small Wars Big Defense (New York Oxford University Press 1992) 115
12 Oye, Eagle 8 10
13 W eidenbaum, Small Wars 115 118
4technology Second, non-defense and defense engineers and scientists are not perfect substitutes ( )
Third, despite low interdisciplinary mobility the supply of engineers and scientists is not fixed. It responds to 
demographic factors changing occupational preferences or any variations in job opportunities ”14
Gold and Adams noted that there are however trade offs between defense and non-defense funds with respect 
to the public sector R& D 15 Assuming that private firms underinvest in R&D due to the difficulty of 
recapturing all of their costs in profits they admit that the present tight budget situation may have a negative 
impact on economy wide R&D The empirical results remain vague The analytical methods are sometimes 
dubious They are mostly based on ex post facto statistics. To measure crowding out effects the additional use 
of ex ante quantities is appropriate because quantity constraints can be considered and a distinction between 
notional and transacted quantities is possible
To perform a quantitative analysis o f the guns and growth trade off Huang and Mintz estimated an equation 
with growth of GNP as the dependent variable and capital stock, labor force and defense sector growth as 
independent variables.16 A similar approach was used m a paper on government size and economic growth by 
Atesoglu and M ueller17 Ram published a paper on government size and economic growth m 198618 For his 
investigation he assumed a two sector economy and used separated production functions for the private and 
government sector He further assumed that the output of the private sector depends on the output of the 
government sector and that the two factor productivities m the different sectors are proportional Following 
Ram and Atesoglu and Mueller I consider an economy to be o f two sectors civilian and defense and the defense 
sector is assumed to indirectly influence the civilian sector The aggregate production function for the defense 
sector (D) and civilian sector (C) are
a
C  = C(Lc Ke)
with total output Q - D  + C and total factor inputs L = LC + L¿  (labor) and K  -  Kc + K¿ (capital) To consider 
different marginal productivities of the factors labor and capital in defense and civilian sectors (D\ Dfc C/ Q ) 
Atesoglu and Mueller assumed that the marginal productivity of factors used m the defense sector is equal to 
7 + 5 times the corresponding marginal factor productivity m the civilian sector i e
(3) AA 5
One problem with this model is that the distinction between civilian and military mput factors is theoretical 
Appropriate data sets are not available because part of what is measured as civilian capital stock and labor mput 
is used for defense purposes as well. Therefore those variables must be eliminated. Basic calculations proceed 
under the assumption of constant marginal factor productivities to the following equation
(4) + CdjA DG
where 7 andCt C, = K  -  K_x are the parameters to be estimated Atesoglu and Mueller
obtained the following result:19
(5) y = -0 071 + 0 518tt- + 26351^+0 4 6 ^
z -i z -i J -i
14 Ibid 118
15 Gold, Defence Economics 1 (1990)
16 Chi Hoang and Alex M intz, Ridge Regression Analysis o f the Defence-Growth Tradeoff m the United Sutes ” Defence 
Econom ics 2 (1990) 29 37
17 H. Sonmez Atesoglu and M ichael J  M oeller “Defence Spending and Economic Growth,” Defence Economics 2 (1990) 19 27
18 Ran Ram, “Government Size and Economic Growth," American Economic Review  79 n. 1 (1986) 191 203
19 Atesoglu and M ueller estimated the equation as first order autoregressive process The sample period is 1949 89 For detailed 
test statistics see Defence Economics 2 (1990) 24
5T he coefficient estimates for the investment ratio and the employment growth effect have theoretically expected 
positive signs and are statistically significant at the usual levels of significance The relatively large estimate 
for the coefficient of employment is simply due to the difference m the units ”20
Due to problems with multicollineanty Huang and Mintz estimated a similiar model by Ridge Regression 
They obtained the following resu lt21
(6) y = -0077+05147t-  + 0 7 0 5 f^ + 1 .3 6 9 ^ S  + 0 3 2 0 ^
and concluded that there is no significant direct trade off between defense spending and growth.
The estimates for the defense coefficient in both regressions are sim ilar in the first case 0 46 m the second 
case 0 32 The hypothesis of a positive relationship between growth of the defense sector and growth of the 
economy cannot be rejected. However for both regressions the marginal productivities for investment, and in 
the second case also the marginal productivity of civilian government expenditures are greater than the 
coefficient for defense spending Although m both investigations no formal test was performed, it can be 
presumed that the economy grows faster if the investment share of GNP is increased rather than the military 
budget Nevertheless the results of those regressions must be interpreted carefully Rao pointed out that m 
these investigations it is assumed that the marginal product of each factor mput m the defense sector bears a 
proportional relationship to its counterpart in the private sector and that the constant proportionality is the 
same for both factors 22 This is a major assumption without justification Furthermore it is assumed that the 
marginal productivity of the defense factor mput is constant over time but no empirical evidence is provided for 
this assumption Economic growth during the 1970s was subject to exogenous shocks The most notable 
shock was the oil crisis of 1973 Thus m time senes regressions it is advisable to introduce a dummy vanable 
to distinguish pre-shock and subsequent penods Misspecification by omitting vanables results in bias of the 
parameter estimates and, moreover standard errors also tend to be biased and significance tests may lead to 
incorrect inferences. The conclusion of no significant direct trade-off between defense spending and economic 
growth does not target the decime argument of authors like Kennedy or Oye They argue that a high military 
burden led to a relative decime of the superpowers with respect to nations like Germany or Japan. Therefore 
cross country comparisons of those estimates would have provided more information than a smgle country 
estimate
Atesoglu and Mueller simulated the effects of 4 7 and 10 percent cuts m defense spending Not 
surprisingly the result was a decrease of output The simulation penod was 1990 to 1995 They calculated for 
the 10 percent cu t a 2.8 percent loss of output for 1995 and concluded that the findings also radicate that the 
responsiveness of economic growth to changes in defense spending is small Accordingly even if there are 
significant reductions m defense spending—except for very large sustained cuts—the adverse effects on the 
economic growth of the United States should not be large ”23 This approach is not sufficiënt to address the 
question of consequences of large defense cuts The GNP growth will possibly decrease in the short run But 
due to greater private investments and non-military government spending GNP will again increase in the long 
run. Those effects cannot be simulated with both investment and military expenditures as exogenous vanables 
And, as stated above GNP is not directly related to the welfare of the nation Even if we argue only about 
economic quantities the structure of the GNP is as important as the amount
A more detailed analysis of the economic effects of reducing US defense spending is provided m a paper by 
Thomas et a l24 Unlike the studies mentioned in the preceding section, Thomas et al used a sophisticated 
Defense Economic Impact Modeling System (DEEMS) instead of a single growth equation to simulate effects on 
other macroeconomic quantities such as unemployment, inflation rate budget deficit, and simulated industrial
20 Ibid.
21 The sample penod is 1952-88 For detailed test statistics see Ibid. 34
22 V V Bhanoij Rao “Government Size and Economic Growth. Comment,” American Economic Review  79 n. 1 (1989) 272 
280
23 Defence Economics 2 (1990) 27
24 R. W illiam Thomas and H. O Stekler G Wayne Glass “The Economic Effects of Reducing US Defence Spending ” Defence 
Econom ics 2 (1991) 183 187
6im pact The defense modeling system contains an outlay estimator the defense translator (or bridge table) a 
macroeconomic model and an input-output model
The defense budget that Congress debates and approves is expressed m budget authority—the authority to 
spend public funds. Therefore the first stage m the forecasting process is to translate this budget authority into 
estimates of outlays which require a timing adjustment For each year of the simulation the outlay vector is 
converted into estimated direct demand on defense by industry* assuming a linear relationship between the 
amount of outlays m each budget category and the final demand for each of the input-output industries supplying 
the Department of Defense (DoD) with items bought with those dollars The assumed level of defense 
expenditures is then used under chosen assumptions for other macroeconomic variables to generate predictions 
for the final demand components of GNP and for output and employment by industry
Table 2 shows the results for the 1990s simulation as reported in the Thomas et al paper The control 
simulation is based on a no-real growth defense budget The defense budget authority is increased from 1990 to 
1995 to keep pace with the rate of inflation Further assumptions are that the US exchange rate declines by 2 5 
percent relative to a composite index of foreign currencies by 1995 money supply M2 grows at an average rate 
of 4.5 percent a labor force growing at 1 percent a year and labor productivity increasing at about 0 7 percent 
annually In alternative scenano A l defense spending is cut by 2 percent a year m real terms and reaches a level 
that is 11 percent below the no-real growth baseime by 1995 The second alternative A2 cuts defense spending 
by 5 percent a year for a cumulative reduction of 27 percent by 1995 The table shows the influence of both 
policies on GNP the unemployment rate and the budget deficit. Both alternatives A l and A2 result m a 
decrease of output and a higher level of unemployment m the first years but after 1993 the economy starts to 
recover and to grow faster The deviation of GNP from the baseline solution decreases The inflation rate is for 
both alternatives below the baseime value and according to the reduced level o f federal spending the cumulative 
deficit is reduced by nearly $100 billion for A l and more than $250 billion for A2 Thomas et al also tned to 
forecast effects of changes in defense spending on particular industries but concluded the dynamics by which 
changes m the amount and composition of a defense decline translate into variations m industrial output vanes 
with the methods used to relate macroeconomic and industrial effects Therefore much confidence in the ability 
of precise predictions might be premature
TABLE 2 Simulation Results
Calendar year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Alt. 1 Administration Plan (2% annual real decime m defense spending) 
Reduction m real GNP [%] 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 1
Increase in unemployment rate [% points] 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1
Decrease m the rate of inflation [% points] 0 0 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 2
Reduction m the federal deficit [billions $] 2 0 7 0 17 0 29 0 42 0
Alt. 2 Administration Plan (5% average annual real decime 
Reduction m real GNP [%]
m defense spending) 
0 3 0 8 0 8 0 4 0 3
Increase m unemployment rate [% points] 0 2 0 5 0 6 0 6 0 4
Decrease m the rate of inflation [% points] 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 0 0 6
Reduction m the federal deficit [billions $] 6 0 17 0 44 0 78 0 117 0
Weidenbaum mentioned two further econometnc simulations that yield the same conclusions 25 Lawrence 
Klem and Kei Mon estimated that short run transition would occur after a large cutback m defense spending 
Temporarily unemployment nses and the economic growth rate slows down. Subsequently however the 
peacetime economy follows a more rapid long run growth path More recent analyses by the consulting firm 
Data Resources Inc have yielded basically similar conclusions concerning former Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney s potential reduction of $180 billion in the dc ense budget over the next five years— the national 
economy can cope with this transition without major problems ”
25 W etdenbanm, Smalt Wars 122.
7Defense Spending and Unemployment
In the political sphere especially in tunes of an election more relevant than GNP figures are unemployment 
figures Regional aspects rather than national aspects play an important role Defense employment can be 
categorized as follows
1 People employed in defense related industries 26
(a) Sub-sectors highly dependent on military orders assumed to be producing something with few 
civilian applications
(b) Sub-sectors producing commodities of mainly civilian application with a very small share of 
output sold to the military
(c) Intermediate sectors where demand shifts may be of little importance but where attrition may occur 
and contribute to workforce reduction significantly
2 People employed by the Armed Forces
The attitude towards the value of defense expenditures becomes ambivalent On the one hand, the use of 
resources is a burden to the nation on the other hand it is related to the prosperity of several regions and 
branches of industry Weidenbaum pointed out that certain members of Congress who in public advocate large 
reductions m military spending the next day come to the White House m a frantic but private effort to save 
the weapon systems being produced m their districts 27 Arguments for benefit cost calculations m the political 
sphere usually rely on a local rather than a national, perspective because voters often decide from their personal 
perspective rath»1 than a national or social view especially as far as their jobs or income are concerned
Unemployment, even in the short run is a severe problem for individuals The recent recession and 
uncertainty about the consequences of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) make the situation 
even worse Five years may be a short penod for an economy but for an unemployed worker with a poor social 
safety net and insufficient savings such a penod can mean ruin. Richards pointed out that m the context of 
slow or stagnating employment growth and shift to a service sector economy redundancy often creates severe 
problems 28 If redundant workers remain unemployed, or pass from one poorly paid job to another they are 
likely to be psychologically weakened and socially alienated. Local communities bitterly resent the closure of 
plants on which their citizens are dependent. The onus is on the authorities to speed job creation overall and 
ease the situation of the victims of such change In the presidential campaign discussion of downsizing the 
military forces was always accompanied by the unemployment issue Former President George Bush wrote 
Since our superpower nval of the last half century has dropped out of the race we are now able to do so 
something we have all hoped for since the close of World War n —tighten the load of the defense burden In the 
short run this adjustment has meant cutbacks and lay-offs m many industries that have depended on defense 
spending ”29 His opponent, President Bill Clinton dedicated a whole section to the topic in his election 
platform Defense Conversion and made a number of proposals for restructuring the American post Cold War 
economy 30
The Defense Related Industries
Conversion is an imprecise concept Enterprises convert by reducing dependence on defense sales and 
diversifying The easiest way is to scrap defense-related production capacity but this is m terms of economic 
policy not the best way “The challenge of conversion is that of making the best use of all the resources 
released by defense cuts particularly the previously employed labor force at least social costs ”31 The major 
problem is that the costs can easily exceed the perceived value of future profits
26 Peter J  Richards “Disarmament and Employment." Defence Economics 2 (1991) 297
27 W eidenhaum, Small Wars 120
28 Defence Economics 2 (1991) 295 311
29 George Bush, Agenda fo r  American Renewal (W ashington D C 1992) 3
30 Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People F irst (New York Times Books 1992) 75-80
31 Defence Economics 2 (1991) 296.
8There is a substantial history of defense companies resisting defense cutbacks via converting—or in the 
language o f business diversifying—into civilian markets A fta- World War H, older and more established 
industries such as automobiles, rubber and steel that had originally converted from civilian markets 
experienced little difficulty m returning to their traditional lines o f business. However the critical point of the 
adjustment challenge was and is, the specialized defense industry Weidenbaum grouped early diversification 
efforts into three major categories.32
Temporary utilization o f idle capacity and manpower to maintain a gomg organization and to 
tide it over until peacetime production gets under way
The purchase o f or investment in firms that would either broaden the base o f operations or at 
least, earn a good profit
The manufacture o f items th at it was hoped, would win a permanent market thus diversifying 
operations and lessening dependence on military orders
Today the most relevant category is the thud, but it is also the least promising Most of the diversification 
attempts have been subsequently abandoned as unsuccessful or marginal Weidenbaum presented several 
examples and analyzed the reasons for the failures 33 The central point is that defense-related industries differ m 
capabilities and shortcomings from commercial compames m tom s of technology organizational structure 
marketing and financing
Defense companies design and produce state-of the-art weapons which mclude the results of great efforts in 
research and development These are high quality products and the firms are used to producing at extremely close 
tolerances. Due to the limited demand, there is limited emphasis on production at low cost Defense firms 
invest primarily in product technology rather than in process technology Their organizational structure is 
geared to the reporting and control requirements of the government that includes many bureaucratic elements 
Given the monopsomstic market structure these firms have only a vague knowledge of marketing The federal 
government being the principal consumer a distribution system for the products is not necessary The 
manufacturer sells and delivers directly to the consumer The pnce of the product is not determined by the 
market forces of demand and supply rather they are negotiated between seller and purchaser There are two 
categories o f contracts, fixed pnce contracts and cost plus contracts. The first type is comparable to civilian 
procedures Government and firm agree on a fixed pnce for the weapon system and the company s profit 
depends directly on the production costs so that an incentive to control the production costs is provided. The 
latter type of contract guarantees the firm a certain profit and the government assumes the risk of increasing 
costs The primary incentive for the company to do well is to get subsequent contracts
As stated above a major point of defense conversion is to avoid massive layoffs and the loss in economic 
product this represents. But because of the significant structural differences existing between defense and 
commercial companies this is a difficult task.34 Weidenbaum pointed out that m the face of large layoffs of 
defense company employees, congressional representatives from defense areas often become a chorus of 
supporters for government to do something35 There are several plans m Washington to force defense compames 
to convert and to smooth this process. The most comprehensive proposal has come from Congressman Ted 
Weiss (D-NY) He suggests setting up joint business-labor alternative use committees to develop plans for 
shifting production to peacetime use when defense contracts are canceled. The plans are intended to provide the 
local community and the employees o f the defense facility with a viable and workable blueprint for the 
conversion of the facility To control and advise the conversion process Weiss proposes to establish a Defense 
Economic Adjustment Council consisting of a majority of private citizens (representatives of the busmess 
management community and the labor unions) The proposal also covers unemployment compensation. All 
employees who lose their jobs by a cutback in the volume of defense u oik would be eligible for two years of 
benefits equal to 90 percent of the first $20 thousand of annual earnings and SO percent o f the next five 
thousand.
32 W adenhaam , Small Wars 45
33 Ihid. 49 54
34 A dangerous way to by-pass the problem of downsizing the defense industry that would be required by budget cuts is to  mercase 
exports of weapon systems For example instead of selling aircraft fighters to  the US A ir Force some companies are now 
looking toward increasing their sales in  the Middle East or elsewhere.
35 W adenbanm , Small Wars 61-65
Unfortunately no estimate of costs has yet been provided to accompany these conversion proposals Weiss 
suggested several methods of financing1 allocating 0 5 percent of the defense procurement budget for economic 
conversion purposes or requiring that 1.25 percent of each defense contractor s sales to the Department of 
Defense has to be used for conversion purposes Weidenbaum remains skeptical Lack of success m the past, 
increased governmental control of private business and high costs in times of budget stringency are all powerful 
factors working against conversion programs36 I believe it is crucial to convince the public that attractive 
civilian alternatives exist for defense contractors in order to defuse opposition to lower military spending that 
comes primarily from expected layoffs.
The Armed Forces
The second category of defense employment is people serving in the military They are affected m a very direct 
way Weidenbaum referred to an estimate by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that an upward limit on 
possible troop reductions is a 4 percent annual cut in real defense spending during the period 1991 to 1995 that 
could result m a cumulative reduction of about 400 thousand m military personnel.37 The challenge involves 
more than numbers because a badly handled reduction in the military force could substantially damage US 
fighting capability Weidenbaum listed five different approaches to reduce the troop size38 The first approach 
m military manpower reductions is to control enlistment and to lower the annual recruitment goal The second 
approach is to deny reenlistment to a greater number of enlisted personnel. A frequently mentioned proposal is 
to give the opportunity of reenlistment only to personnel who have completed at least five years of active duty 
A third alternative is to allow military personnel to retire from the service earlier than they can under current 
regulations. A fourth option is to induce midlevel officers to resign by removing the limit of $30 thousand on 
severance pay for those who have served at least seven years The fifth approach is to increase the power of the 
Selective Early Retirement Board that passes on officers in the middle ranks Those selected could be eligible to 
retire one year earlier m their rank.
To help the people leaving the armed forces a safety net provided by the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) a thirteen week unemployment compensation job counseling seminars and education and training 
programs serve to smooth the transition into civilian life39 Thus there already exists a spectrum of benefits 
and services available to people impacted by armed force reductions This net should be enlarged and financially 
supported by the federal government through dollars saved in the defense budget
Conclusion
In this paper I have examined some of the possible effects of defense spending cuts on output and 
unemployment in the US economy A decrease m GNP in the short run, but a faster long term growth after an 
adjustment period of about three to five years is very likely This may not sound too bad for the US economy 
as a whole However the real problems are more deep-rooted. The US economy is just recovering from a 
recession and the fear of inducing new stagnation is high So in the short run it would be much easier to 
maintain the military production capacity and sell the weapon systems abroad, but I think this is the wrong 
way As stated above I am convinced that in the post-Cold War era the external security threat for the United 
States has significantly decreased and therefore the challenge of restructuring the economy should be undertaken 
now Economic considerations must not prohibit the process of disarmament. Intelligent governmental 
intervention can smooth the adaptation process and create employment prospects for the people affected by 
defense cuts Conversion incentives unemployment compensation retraining programs and additional support 
for communities whose regional economies rely heavily on either defense companies or military bases are 
necessary These projects can be financed by dollars saved m the defense budget This would be a step towards a 
new world order
36 Und. 68
37 Ibid. 82.
38 Ibid. 83 85
39 A dubious proposal was made by President Bill Clinton during the election campaign. He wants 100 thousand form er m ilitary 
personnel to  fight an America s streets for law and order See Clinton Putting People F irst 76
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